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Abstract 
In this article, a game-theoretic model is constructed that is related to the problem of optimal 
assignments. Examples are considered. A compromise point is found, the Nash equilibriums and the 
decision of the Nash arbitration scheme are constructed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic demand on “educated” (high-skill) employees has been grown recently. 
The expected discounted salaries of high-skill employees have grown. Thus, the 
investments of time, effort and money into education have been attracting more and 
more citizens. The “educated employees” are supposed to be competent workers that 
have all the required skills and knowledge to accomplish their responsibilities. The 
education can reduce unemployment all over the world and Russia is not the 
exception. Education is an investment project with additional positive or negative 
benefit. The educational service is characterized by immateriality and variability; it’s 
difficult for consumers to estimate its quality. It’s also hard to compare this service 
with analogous services. These facts stipulated the complexity of labour force training 
research. The problem of labour force training research and necessity to enlarge the 
employees’ level of education can be solved via economicmathematical methods. 
Assigning workers to the manufactures where the formers can get higher 
qualifications makes workers more capable to solve problems in their main area of 
employment. Mathematical models of such kind are studied in the papers [1-38]. 
 For the case of six players, three models are built, for which there are given  
the solution of the assignments problem on the basis of different principles of 
optimality. Consider the set agricultural enterprises 𝐻 = {ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚}, which offer 
jobs and the set of agricultural workers 𝑆 = {𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛}, which wish to get a job at 
some agricultural enterprise. We  assume that each agricultural enterprise ℎ𝑖 has one 
vacancy. For this position the agricultural enterprise wishes to receive the employee. 
Each employee can be recruited for only one agricultural company. The worker can 
be assigned to a job at the enterprise only if an agreement is reached between him and 
the agricultural enterprise. The result of the game is the appointment of an employee 
to agricultural enterprise. 
 
 Model 1. 
 Consider the game in normal form. [5]  
 Γ =< 𝐼, {𝑋}𝑖=1
6 , {𝐻}𝑖=1
6 >. 
 
Here     • 𝐼 = {1,2,3,4,5,6} is  a set of players. Players with numbers 1,2,3 
belong to the sub-set 𝑆 of the set 𝐼.  Players with numbers 4,5,6 belong to the subset 
𝐻.  
    • 𝑋𝑖  is the set of strategies of the player 𝑖 . 𝑋 = ∏ ‍
6
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖  is the set of  
6-tuples (possible situations) in the game.  
    • 𝐻𝑖: 𝑋 = ∏ ‍
6
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖 → 𝑅1 —is a payoff function of the player 𝑖.  
 
Each player has three strategies. The player from the set 𝑆  can choose only one 
player from the set 𝐻. . The player from the set  𝐻 can choose only one player from 
the set 𝑆. 
Let's rename the players from the subset as follows: 𝐻 = {ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3}, implying that 
ℎ1 is the player under number 1 (in the set 𝐻), ℎ2 the player under the number 2 and  
ℎ3 is the player under the number 3. Formally, every assignment of a worker to a 
work can be represented as substitution of the form: 
 
                                  (
1 2 3
ℎ𝑘 ℎ𝑙 ℎ𝑚). 
 
The first line is unchanged here. It corresponds to the workers' numbers, the second 
line corresponds to the jobs. In our problem there are six such substitutions: 
 
𝑃 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝6}. 
 
 
 𝑝1 = (
1 2 3
ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3), 
 
 𝑝2 = (
1 2 3
ℎ2 ℎ1 ℎ3), 
 
 𝑝3 = (
1 2 3
ℎ3 ℎ2 ℎ1), 
 
 … 
 
 𝑝6 = (
1 2 3
ℎ2 ℎ3 ℎ1). 
 
Similarly, we get  six substitutions from the set 𝑄 = {𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞6}.  They correspond 
to the distribution of jobs for workers. The first line corresponds to the number of jobs 
in the set 𝐻. The second line of the substitution corresponds to workers under the 
numbers 1,2 and 3. These are the substitutions of the form: 
 
 (
1 2 3
𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑙 𝑠𝑚). 
 
A situation in the game Γ viewed as substitution. Note that in this way we do 
not exhaust the set of all situations in the game. We distinguish only those of them, 
which make it possible to make substitutions. 
It is necessary to find the full compromise set 𝐶𝐻  and the set ‍𝑁  of Nash 
equilibrium situations.  
We introduce utility matrices 𝐴, 𝐵 for players from subsets 𝑆 and 𝐻: 
Matrix A (the rows correspond to the numbers of players from subsets of 𝑆, and the 
columns correspond to the set ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3 respectively.)    
 
 𝐴 = (
75 22 94
33 41 86
45 13 54
) 
 
 Matrix B (the rows correspond to the set ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3 respectively, and the columns 
correspond to ordinal numbers of players from  . Then  
  𝐵 = (
94 71 17
30 32 18
59 85 38
). 
 
 We define the players winning functions on the substitution set 𝑃 as follows: 
 
 𝐻1(𝑝1) = 𝛼1ℎ1 = 76, 
 
 𝐻2(𝑝1) = 𝛼2ℎ2 = 41, 
 
 𝐻3(𝑝1) = 𝛼3ℎ3 = 54, 
 
 𝐻4(𝑝1) = 𝛽ℎ11 = 94, 
 
 𝐻5(𝑝1) = 𝛽ℎ22 = 32, 
 
 𝐻6(𝑝1) = 𝛽ℎ33 = 38, 
 
  
 
 
𝛼𝑙ℎ𝑘 – is the element of matrix 𝐴 at the intersection 𝑙-ой row and ℎ𝑘-th column, and 
𝛽ℎ𝑘𝑙  – is an element of the matrix 𝐵  at the intersection ℎ𝑘 -th row and the 𝑙 -th 
column. On the set of substitutions 𝑄 the winning functions are defined in a similar 
way. On substitutions from sets 𝑃  and 𝑄  within identical numbers, the payoff 
functions will coincide. 
   Substitutions with identical numbers correspond to the same situation in the game. 
Therefore, the number of different situations in the game is two times less than the 
total number of substitutions and equal to six (we take this into account when drawing 
up a payoff matrix). The matrix has the form( the rows correspond to substitutions 
𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝6, which form the set of situations X, the columns correspond to the numbers 
of players from the set 𝐼):  
 
 
(
  
 
76 41 54 94 32 38
22 33 54 30 71 38
94 41 45 59 32 17
94 33 13 94 71 18
76 86 13 94 85 18
22 86 45 30 85 17)
  
 
 
 
We calculate the real vector 𝑀 = (𝑀1, . . . , 𝑀6) with the formula: 
 
 𝑀𝑖 = max
𝑥∈𝑋
𝐻𝑖(𝑥) 
 
We obtain the following result: 
 
 𝑀 = (94,86,54,94,85,38). 
 
We compute the compromise set 𝐶𝐻 with the formula: 
 
𝐶𝐻 = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋:max
𝑖
(𝑀𝑖 −𝐻𝑖(𝑥)) ≤ max
𝑖
(𝑀𝑖 −𝐻𝑖(𝑥′)), ∀𝑥′ ∈ 𝑋} 
 
We obtain the following result: 
 
 𝐶𝐻 = {𝑝5}. 
 
The situation 𝑝5  leads to the following assignments: the first worker gets assigned to 
the first enterprise (the fist enterprise get the first worker), the second one gets 
assigned at the third enterprise, and the third one at the second. Notice, that the full 
compromise set is such that the least satisfied player gets a guaranteed prize. In 
accordance with the winning function the third player is satisfied less than the rest in 
this situation and gets their guaranteed prize equal to 13, or 𝐻3(𝑝5) = 13. 
The set of Nash equilibrium situations is found thus:   
 
 {𝑥∗ ∈ 𝑋:𝐻𝑖(𝑥
∗ ∥ 𝑥) ≤ 𝐻𝑖(𝑥), ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼}, 
 
 𝜙𝜑𝜒(𝑥∗ ∥ 𝑥) = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑖−1, 𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝑥𝑖+1, . . . , 𝑥6). 
 
In our problem, if any of the six players changes their decision, while the rest 
do not, we cannot complete the assignment. In other words ,if the winning function 
equals to zero. Therefore all the situations in the game are examples of Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
  Model 2. 
 
Let 𝐻 = (ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3)—be the set of job and, 
 𝑆 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3)— be the set of workers. The efficiency matrices are set for 
both workers and jobs, respectively. We will solve two optimal assignment problems: 
assign workers to jobs and distribute the jobs among workers so as to maximize the 
overall utility for both. 
 1. Assignment problem for workers. 
 Matrix  
 𝐴 = (
40 20 10
15 12 8
32 30 18
) 
 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑖 = 1. .3, 𝑗 = 1. .3) — is the efficiency of assigning a worker to a job. We 
solve the problem using the Hungarian algorithm and get the assignment matrix. 
 
 𝑋 = (
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
) 
 
Then the effectiveness of assignments will be 
 
 ∑ ‍3𝑖=1 ∑ ‍
3
𝑗=1 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 40 + 8 + 30 = 78 
 
 2.  The problem of the distribution of jobs among workers. 
Matrix  
 𝐵 = (
9 14 21
11 7 5
8 16 25
). 
 
where 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑖 = 1. .3, 𝑗 = 1. .3)— is the efficiency of the distribution of jobs for the 
worker. Solving the problem in a similar way, we obtain the assignment matrix. 
 
 𝑌 = (
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
). 
Then the distribution efficiency 
 
 ∑ ‍3𝑖=1 ∑ ‍
3
𝑗=1 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 21 + 11 + 16 = 48. 
 
From the first and second tasks it is clear that two of the three appointments did not 
coincide. Thus, if we assign workers to jobs and distribute the jobs among workers 
independently of each other, maximizing only our own effectiveness, then it is not 
possible to make acceptable assignments. One solution to this problem is to create a 
union of workers and a trade union of employers who, caring about the interests of 
their members, seek to find a mutually beneficial solution through negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
Model 3. 
 
 
 
The task that this model solves is to come to an agreement for reasonable players in 
the joint choice of the solution in the course of negotiations. Set a bimatrix game for 
two players - the S workers 'union and the employers' union H the payoff  matrix: 
 
(
(6,2) (0,0)
(0,0) (2,6)
) 
 
On the plane (𝐾1,𝐾2) (𝐾1is the payoff function of the workers 'union (player 1), 𝐾2 is 
the payoff function of the employers' union (player 2)), consider the set R 
corresponding to the possible payoff vectors in joint mixed strategies for our game. 
Together, players can realize any gain in mixed strategies in the R area (the boundary 
of the R-triangle with the vertices 𝑂(0,0), 𝑎(2,6), 𝑏(6,2)). However, this does not 
mean that they can agree on any outcome of the game. So, for union S the point (6,2) 
is most preferable, and for trade union H-point (2,6) ) is most preferable. None of the 
players will agree with the results of the negotiations if his payoffs are less than the 
maximum value, since he can get this payoff independently (regardless of the partners 
actions ). Maximine mixed strategies are as follows: 
 
max
𝑥
min{𝐾1(𝑥, 𝛽1), 𝐾1(𝑥, 𝛽2)} = min{𝐾1(𝑥
0, 𝛽1), 𝐾1(𝑥
0, 𝛽2)} 
 
 
where 𝛽1, 𝛽2 are the player's pure strategies 2, 𝑥
0 = (𝜉0, 1 − 𝜉0),0 ≤ 𝜉 ≤ 1 is the 
mixed strategy of player 1, which he intends to select in order to maximize one of the 
two values 𝐾1(𝑥, 𝛽1), 𝐾1(𝑥, 𝛽2). 
Maximin mixed strategies of players have the form 
𝑥0 = (
1
4
,
3
4
) , 𝑦0 = (
3
4
,
1
4
)  , respectively, and the payoff vector in the maximin 
strategies (𝑣1
0, 𝑣2
0) = (
3
2
,
3
2
). Therefore, the set S, negotiable, is bounded by the points 
𝑎(2,6), 𝑏(6,2), 𝑐, 𝑑(
3
2
,
3
2
), 𝑒, e (c, e are the intersection points of the rays emerging 
from the point d and parallel to the axes, with the sides of the triangle). This is the 
negotiating set of the game. Further, acting together, players can always agree to 
select points on the segment 𝑎𝑏, since it is beneficial to both of them (the segment 𝑎𝑏 
corresponds to the Pareto optimal situations). It is necessary to choose a point 
(𝑣1, 𝑣2) from the set S, which will be obtained in the result of negotiations. The Nash 
arbitrage  scheme [7] gives the vector (𝑣1, 𝑣2) = (4,4) 
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